Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe April 20, 2010, BP Deepwater Horizon blowout riveted citizen and elected officials' attention on coastal oil spills in ways not seen since the ill‐fated 1989 Exxon Valdez crisis. A commonly voiced lament included why was the tragedy not prevented? Why the seemingly poor safety practices and who is to blame? Could a spill of such catastrophic proportion happen elsewhere in the future? Applying a spill prevention causation framework developed through the examination of other major near‐shore incidents over a 23‐year period, the author finds Deepwater Horizon exhibited a pattern of shortcomings evident in these other spills. These shortcomings are rooted in policy imperfections, a weak regulatory regime, organizational deviance in lieu of integrity, and interorganizational structure deficiencies.

AbstractFrom the mid‐1960s through 1980, major policy changes were adopted as a result of federal and state public lands protection statutes. This article analyzes the impact these policy changes have had upon the economies of gateway communities, a subject of limited discussion in the scholarly literature. One conclusion is that gateway community economies have become less dependent on resources extraction. This analysis finds that several factors––beyond policy change––have influenced the shift away from resources extraction. Likewise, there is the question over what economic mainstays have stepped in to fill the resources extraction void? For many gateway communities, it appears that the answer has been recreational tourism. The implications of this economic shift within gateway communities are explored.

AbstractOn January 7, 1994, the disabled tank barge Morris J. Berman ran aground spilling 750,000 gallons of heavy‐grade fuel oil on the beaches of San Juan, Puerto Rico. The spill impacted a variety of resources and temporarily shut down a portion of the tourist industry during the height of the winter season. The spill is noteworthy as the first major incident in U.S. coastal waters following passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). A landmark provision passed as a result of the 1989 Exxon Valdez catastrophe. The Berman spill provides a test case for assessing the robustness of policy mandates incorporated in the OPA 90. Mandates that compelled the oil transportation and response network to assume high‐reliability organization characteristics. The study finds that although high‐reliability characteristics were seemingly adopted their implementation during the Berman spill evidenced a significant number of shortcomings.

AbstractEvery year millions of tourists hit the open road to enjoy America's public recreation lands. Upon arrival at their destinations, visitors enjoy a host of service amenities ranging from hotels and lodges to ski resorts and back country adventures, all compliments of concessioners. These public lands concessioner operations are a multibillion dollar business. This decades‐long analysis finds that local service providers have generally failed to secure concessioner contracts on public lands. A focus among more politically adept participants upon other policy priorities has eclipsed local provider preferences despite periodic opportunities for change and economic need.

AbstractThe federal government's adoption of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 represented a radical statutory departure from past policy. Coastal oil spill control provisions that had languished for decades within the industry‐friendly confines of a few select congressional subcommittees suddenly became law. Much popular belief credits the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill crisis for bringing about this radical policy change. Closer examination reveals that postcrisis policy change is much more complex. Crisis events intermingle with other short‐ and long‐term factors that either inhibit or support dramatic change. This study analyzes change within the coastal spill arena over several decades. Particular attention is given to crisis episodes, periods identified with a major catastrophe or a successive series of attention‐getting spills over a brief time. Analysis finds that crises can play an instrumental role in eliciting change.

The federal government's adoption of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 represented a radical statutory departure from past policy. Coastal oil spill control provisions that had languished for decades within the industry-friendly confines of a few select congressional subcommittees suddenly became law. Much popular belief credits the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill crisis for bringing about this radical policy change. Closer examination reveals that postcrisis policy change is much more complex. Crisis events intermingle with other short- & long-term factors that either inhibit or support dramatic change. This study analyzes change within the coastal spill arena over several decades. Particular attention is given to crisis episodes, periods identified with a major catastrophe, or a successive series of attention-getting spills over a brief time. Analysis finds that crises can play an instrumental role in eliciting change. 3 Figures, 52 References. Adapted from the source document.

Clearly, this is a symposium driven by the recent spate of crises in our still new 21st century. We hope to present a timely symposium relevant to currents of public policy. Our intent is broader than dealing with these great world crises. We have collected a series of papers that broadly address numerous types of latent, impending, & possible disasters: natural, technological, manufactured, & those of obsolescence. Beyond differences of policy type, the papers in this symposium focus on different sets of activity within the policy process, tie process actions together, & examine the outcomes & consequences of crisis policy. Adapted from the source document.